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Abstract
This papers sheds light on the puzzling fact that even though open
source software (OSS) is a public good, it is developed for free by
highly qualiﬁed, young, motivated individuals, and evolves at a rapid
pace. We show that when OSS development is understood as the pri-
vate provision of a public good, these features emerge quite naturally.
We adapt a dynamic private-provision-of-public-goods model to reﬂect
key aspects of the OSS phenomenon. Apart from extrinsic motives
(namely signaling), the present model also contains intrinsic motives
of OSS programmers, such as play value or homo ludens payoﬀ, user-
programmers’ and gift culture beneﬁts. Such intrinsic motives feature
extensively in the wider OSS literature and contribute new insights to
the economic analysis.
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11 Introduction
With the success of famous open source software (OSS) products like the
operating system ‘Linux’, the ‘Apache Web Server’ or the web browser ‘Fire-
fox’, the open source movement has attracted the interest of economists; e.g.
Johnson (2002), Lerner and Tirole (2002), Myatt and Wallace (2002), Mus-
tonen (2003), Bitzer (2004), and Von Krogh and von Hippel (2003); see Rossi
(2006) for a recent literature review. What puzzles economists dealing with
this topic is the fact that OSS – a public good1 – is developed for free by
highly educated volunteer programmers and at a speed of innovation that in
some respects outpaces commercial software development. Yet, in general,
economic theory would predict that privately provided public goods suﬀer
from problems of under-provision, delays in supply, and inferior quality.
In the attempt to answer the question of why someone might contribute
to OSS projects, economists have proposed a broad range of programmer
motives. Some studies emphasize the importance of job signaling as a mo-
tivation for participation in OSS projects, e.g. Lerner and Tirole (2002).
Others point to the private beneﬁts for the participating programmers in so
far as software they need themselves is developed – user-programmers, e.g.
Johnson (2002). Recent empirical studies again show that strong drivers
for OSS programmers can be found in intrinsic motives such as the fun of
programming, e.g. Hertel et al. (2003), Lakhani and Wolf (2005), and the
gift culture surrounding OSS, e.g. Raymond (2000a, 2000b), Zeitlyn (2003).
Thus, the motivation of OSS developers is a mixture of extrinsic motives
like signaling and future wages, and intrinsic motives like their own need for
software, fun / play and gift culture. Obviously, the beneﬁts of all of these
types of payoﬀs / motives could compensate a potential provider of the pub-
lic good OSS for his private costs of programming. Thus, an analysis of OSS
provision is well advised to acknowledge the existence of multiple motives,
because the motive mix and the structure of the gain and cost streams may
diﬀer over time, the identiﬁcation of the skills of a programmer via the signal
set by programming OSS might be blurred by the existence of intrinsic mo-
tives, and the distribution of motives in programmer communities may diﬀer
between OSS projects.
1OSS is a public good since it features non-rivalry in consumption (a characteristic
of most non-material goods) and non-excludability, see Appendix C. The latter feature
is ensured by distribution of OSS under licenses of the Free Software Foundation (FSF)
such as GNU GPL, or GNU LGPL, which stipulate that the source code of software can
be copied, modiﬁed, distributed freely and that – most importantly – all derived work is
covered by the same open source license (FSF (2004)). See Bitzer and Schr¨ oder (2006),
and Lerner and Tirole (2005) for a detailed discussion of OSS licensing schemes.
2Theoretical research on OSS has incorporated several programmer mo-
tives into private-provision-of-public-goods frameworks – e.g. Johnson
(2002), Myatt and Wallace (2002) and Bitzer and Schr¨ oder (2005) – although
none has incorporated all of the motives discussed above simultaneously.
Johnson (2002), in particular, models user-developers and thus also features
an intrinsic motive. In contrast to the model of the present paper, he uses
a static model with incomplete information and studies the eﬀects of popu-
lation size on the probability that an OSS product will be provided. Myatt
and Wallace (2002) consider, in a binary-action public good provision game,
issues of free riding and coordination, including the classic motives of user-
programmer beneﬁts and cost of provision. Their focus is on the existence
and selection of equilibria. Bitzer and Schr¨ oder (2005) start with the same
model as the present paper but introduce repeated contribution to the OSS,
which enables them to examine joining and exiting dynamics of OSS com-
munities. They include signaling as a private payoﬀ, but do not distinguish
separating and pooling equilibria and they ignore further intrinsic motives.
This is the point of departure for the present paper, which, by incorpo-
rating a range of intrinsic and extrinsic motives into the analysis, attempts
to arrive at a richer characterization of the contributors and initiators of OSS
projects. The model of the present paper examines the OSS phenomenon as
a private-provision-of-public-goods model. In particular we follow the tradi-
tion of Bliss and Nalebuﬀ (1984), Hendricks et al. (1988) and Bilodeau and
Slivinski (1996). Apart from the usual beneﬁts and private costs connected
to the provision of the public good, we augment the model to capture the
following motives. First, we include signaling in the way that agents are
employed by ﬁrms and where being the provider of OSS can serve as a signal
potentially triggering higher future earnings. Furthermore, we include addi-
tional private payoﬀs capturing homo ludens payoﬀ, and a gift beneﬁt. We
use this framework to study some key characteristics of OSS providers that
would prevail under separating and pooling equilibria, whereas in the latter
case, the private provision of OSS becomes a continuous time n player war
of attrition. We arrive at the following ﬁndings: within the model, ceteris
paribus an OSS-programming individual is characterized by a larger value
attached to the gift beneﬁt, a longer time horizon (i.e. a younger individ-
ual), more patience, higher eﬃciency (lower development cost), and a high
homo ludens payoﬀ, i.e. the value derived from playing with the software
and mastering the challenge. Moreover, a higher gain from using the OSS
software solution (user-programmer beneﬁt) matters in a pooling equilib-
rium but has no inﬂuence on deﬁning the group of potential providers in a
separating equilibrium.
The central limitation of the present framework is that we establish nei-
3ther full characterizations nor existence of equilibria, since such an analysis
would require additional assumptions and explicit structure on the distribu-
tion of parameters in the community of programmers. However, to reach the
aim of our paper – namely, to determine key characteristics of OSS providers
– it is suﬃcient to examine some central characteristics of fairly broad classes
of equilibria, namely separating and pooling equilibria of the game. A draw-
back of this approach is that the present model has little to say about the
actual provider in situations where separation occurs and more than one
agent wants to develop the OSS in question simultaneously, and if – or under
what conditions – the one or the other type of equilibria occurs. Further-
more, it must be noted that our model can only endeavor to capture part of
the many aspects surrounding OSS. For example, the dynamics within OSS
programmer communities, or what type of software products and organiza-
tion structures are conducive to this production method are not addressed
within the present work.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the motives of OSS
contributors discussed in the literature and relates our model to this context.
Section 3 introduces the formal model. In Section 4, we discuss the results
of our model. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Motives to program OSS
There have been a number of papers dealing with the motivation of program-
mers and examining why they are willing to program OSS. Raymond (2000a,
2000b), Lerner and Tirole (2002), Torvalds and Diamond (2001) carried out
case-study-based analysis, focussing on famous OSS projects like the Apache
Web Server, Perl, and sendmail. Empirical studies based on the analysis of
web archives are those of Hertel et al. (2003), who dealt with Linux, and
Lakhani and Wolf (2005), Krishnamurthy (2002), and Hars and Ou (2002)
who were concerned with a broad range of diﬀerent OSS projects.
In the studies mentioned, two general groups of motives are identiﬁed:
intrinsic and extrinsic motives. While intrinsic motivation describes the sit-
uation in which somebody is doing something because it is inherently inter-
esting, enjoyable or challenging, in the case of extrinsic motivation, someone
expects a separable outcome (Deci and Ryan, 1985, Ryan and Deci 2000).
A central aim of the present paper is to capture within a formal framework
a broad range of motives and to characterize those agents who are willing
to provide the initial public good OSS. The motivation of a programmer for
starting an OSS project is of course a mixture of intrinsic motives on the one
hand, and of classic extrinsic motives on the other. Reviewing the rapidly
4emerging literature on OSS, we identify three crucial themes which regularly
appear when analyzing the intrinsic motivation of OSS programmers and in
particular of initiators: (a) the need for a particular software solution, i.e.
the phenomenon of user-programmers, (b) the fun of play, i.e. some form of
homo ludens payoﬀ, and (c) the desire to give a present to the programmer
community, i.e. a gift beneﬁt.
In particular the latter two motives are greatly underrated in economics –
with some notable exceptions (Frey and Osterloh, 2002, Lindenberg, 2001) –
yet are frequently discussed in other branches of the social sciences. Motives
such as gift beneﬁt and homo ludens payoﬀ are included in the OSS accounts
of e.g. Zeitlyn (2003), Torvalds and Diamond (2001), Raymond (2000a,
2000b).2
A crucial prerequisite for starting an OSS project is the need for a partic-
ular software. Founders usually start a project because they are not satisﬁed
with existing software or simply because the required software does not exist.
Linus Torvalds, for example, needed a Unix for his PC, and the result was
Linux (Torvalds and Diamond, 2001), Eric Allman needed a more eﬃcient
email server resulting in ‘Sendmail’, Larry Wall needed a tool to automati-
cally generate web pages resulting in ‘Perl’, and ﬁnally Don Knuth needed a
convenient tool for type-setting documents resulting in ‘TEX’ (Knuth, 1979).
Thus, the programmer beneﬁts directly from developing the software. How-
ever, this is insuﬃcient for explaining why someone does the programming
himself – instead of hiring an outsider – and more importantly why an agent
would make the programming result publicly available and for free. Accord-
ingly, other intrinsic motives may play a crucial role for the initiator of an
OSS project.
Apart from the substantial contracting problems that outsourcing of the
programming activity would cause, it is striking to note that important OSS
contributors insist that they are doing the programming ‘just for fun’ (Tor-
valds and Diamond, 2001). Programming is regarded as a leisure-time ac-
tivity, i.e. playing around with the possibilities of software or mastering the
challenge as a pastime. This idea – that the fun of play is an important
motivation for humans – is not new and can be traced back to Plato; the
locus classicus is Johan Huizinga (1938). Huizinga’s homo ludens, the play-
ful human, means in our setting that the programmer receives some form
of beneﬁt simply from carrying out the programming or from mastering a
software problem. Raymond even goes one step further and argues that the
2Lerner and Tirole (2002) also acknowledge such motivational drivers, e.g. “A ’cool’
open source project may be more fun than a routine task” (Lerner and Tirole, 2002, p.
213).
5intrinsic interest in the software leads to better-quality programming:
“It may well turn out that one of the most important eﬀects of
open source’s success will be to teach us that play is the most
economically eﬃcient mode of creative work.”
(Raymond, 2000b, chapter 11)
Thus, the fun of playing appears to be another important factor for start-
ing an OSS project, but like the motive ‘need for a new software’, it is not
suﬃcient on its own. There are thousands of programmers who program new
software because they need it and have fun programming it, but these pro-
grammers decide to earn money with the ﬁnal product or refuse to publish
the source code and instead keep it as a private software solution. Thus,
what is the motive to turn one’s eﬀorts into a public good, namely publish
the source code of one’s programm and have it licensed under, for example,
the GPL?
There are a host of candidate motives and the literature is far from set-
tled on the issue. Although the various explanations diﬀer, all of them carry
the common theme of ‘giving one’s program as a gift to the community’. We
summarize such motives under the term ‘gift culture’ (Berking, 1996; Zeit-
lyn, 2003). One of the motives falling into this category is the desire to gain
a reputation within the hacker community. The names of the ‘patrons’ are
distributed with the source code of their piece of software, which includes
a list (e.g. the update log) of all contributors to the project. In this way,
the individual’s acceptance within the community is boosted and thus its
reputation and social status. The ‘gift’ that the programmer gives to the
community thus determines his ‘social status’ within it (Raymond 2000a,
chapters 6-8).3 Another motive is what Hars and Ou (2002) call ‘community
identiﬁcation’. By this they mean that programmers see the open source
community as a family striving towards convergence of their individual goals
and the goals of the community. Members see the community as ‘kin’ and
are therefore willing to do something that might be beneﬁcial to the com-
munity, although not necessarily to themselves. Of course, ‘membership’ in
the OSS community entails some kind of obligation for the individual pro-
grammer to follow the rules of the community, i.e. to publish the source
code of his software.4 Although this is not obvious, Lindenberg (2001) shows
3Closely connected to the ‘social status’ of a programmer is his ability to attract support
(e.g. bug reports, feature requests) from the community.
4Of course another explanation might be that it is simply fun to discuss one’s work
with like-minded people. We owe this point to an anonymous referee.
6that obligations can be considered as intrinsic motives, arguing that if peo-
ple act based on a principle, they do not pursue external rewards. Another
branch of the obligation hypothesis can be regarded as ‘reciprocal altruism’
in the sense that the volunteers who invest their eﬀorts carry a belief that
other programmers investing eﬀorts in related problems will also make the
resulting solution publicly available. Finally, pure altruism must also be
mentioned as an important motive for publishing the source code of one’s
software. For example, Richard Stallman (1999) regards OSS, with its pro-
motion of computer users’ right to use, study, copy, modify, and redistribute
computer programs, as a social movement based on fundamental democratic
principles.5 Publishing the source code of one’s software may thus often be
based on the wish to support this movement.
It is important to note that such explanations of gift culture are only
feasible due to the freely available information within the community of de-
velopers. The close-to-costless information ﬂow within the community is a
crucial characteristic of the open source development process. Information
about new or ongoing projects, feature requests, bug reports and bug ﬁxes
is compiled on websites and in news groups receiving wide circulation. In-
formation about contributors is embedded in the source code itself. Most
importantly, the source code is not only the product itself, it is also a com-
plete blueprint of the product, and in fact a log of which members of an OSS
community created which elements of the software, and not least, how they
did it.
Finally, a similar argument can be made for the signal embedded in the
provision of OSS (e.g. Lerner and Tirole, 2002). While the programming
of a well-functioning piece of closed source software may generate a valuable
intra-ﬁrm signal that could lead to promotions or higher wages, an OSS signal
is much more transparent and, more importantly, reveals more information
on the performance of the programmer, precisely because a large amount
of information is contained in the source code itself. Even for experts, it is
diﬃcult to assess the eﬀort required to write a piece of software without the
information incorporated in the source code. Accordingly, community mem-
bers have an immense interest in revealing as much information as possible
on their project to either display the value of their ‘gift’ and/or to signal
their abilities to potential employers.
To sum up, the value of the public good OSS in combination with the
various private beneﬁts captured by the above mentioned extrinsic and in-
trinsic motives compensate the contributor of the OSS for his private costs
of programming.
5Cf. www.fsf.org for more information.
73 The Model
Consider a population of n ﬁnitely lived individuals i, who are software pro-
grammers employed continuously throughout their lifetime. Let Ti denote
individual i’s ﬁnite time horizon. Apart from his day job, each individual
has the ability to develop one discrete unit of OSS, which is identical for all
individuals, and consumption of which is characterized by non-rivalry and
non-excludability.6 Thus, the software is a public good and, once developed,
it exists forever. Time is continuous and individuals discount the future at
rate ri. Utility ﬂows from software are as follows: Without the OSS, indi-
viduals have to live with a commercial proprietary software alternative and
receive each an identical utility ﬂow normalized to zero. From the time of
introduction of the OSS, all individuals obtain the ﬂow utility zi ≥ 0 for all
i = 1,...,n, i.e., the ﬂow value of the OSS becoming available.
Individuals can produce the OSS software at a cost. If individual i is the
actual developer of the software, he suﬀers – depending on his programming
skills – a one-time development cost ci ≥ 0, but receives a one-time play value
pi ≥ 0 (homo ludens payoﬀ) and a net utility ﬂow gi ≥ 0, denoting the gift
beneﬁt incurred until the end of the agent’s life. Each individual receives the
independently distributed zi,ci,gi and pi drawn from distributions Sk, where
k = z,c,g,p.7 It is assumed that within the group n (the community) the
individual costs and beneﬁts realizations are common knowledge, but that
employers (ﬁrms) only know the distributions Sk, yet not the realized values
of individuals.
The total net cost for agent i of voluntarily developing the software at






that pi and gi do not outweigh the development cost ci (i.e. providing the
OSS still implies a net cost) but that all individuals ﬁnd it worthwhile to
6This modelling of a one-oﬀ complete piece of software captures the situation of a
project initiator. The actual OSS programming process of ongoing projects consists instead
of multiple contributions by various programmers to the pool of OSS, say programming
enhancement or a new module to an ongoing OSS project. This issue is examined –
based on a model related to the present framework – in Bitzer and Schr¨ oder (2005). Also
note that the present set-up could also be re-interpreted to capture a situation where all
programmers continuously engage in various ongoing OSS projects alongside their day job,
but that the start of a new and promising project or module requires an extraordinary
eﬀort by one agent – the leader. On the role of such leaders in the start-up of OSS see
also Lerner and Tirole (2002).
7Notice that we thus permit situations where several of the cost and beneﬁt parameters
do take value zero for several or all agents.










> 0 ∀ i = 1,...,n . (1)
Thus, by (1) we deﬁne who is a computer programmer and part of the OSS
community, namely people with relatively low net costs of development and
those with much to gain from the OSS. In the normal-form version of this
game, a pure strategy of the individuals in community n is a time ti ∈ [0,Ti)
where i will develop if no one else already has done so, and it will depend on
his beneﬁt from the existence of the OSS, the cost of developing the software
himself, his time preference, and the wage.8
Next consider the labor market. Assume that a number of identical
commercial software ﬁrms each employ m < n computer programmers
and compete for the labor force represented by community n. The soft-
ware production process is such that ﬁrm proﬁts, π, depend, inter alia, on
the average programming costs, 1
m
Pm





i=1 ci < 0. The individual ci (and zi, pi, and gi) realizations, however,
are unobservable to employers, but the distributions Sk are known to ﬁrms.




i=1 ci) = 1
n
Pn
i=1 ci = ¯ c. The provider of the OSS, however, is identi-
ﬁed; thus being the provider of the public good can serve as a signal. Since
the OSS, and hence the signal, comes as a discrete event, all separating equi-
libria feature only two types of wage contracts, namely high and low wages,




i=1;i6=j ci = ¯ c, for large n and where agent j is the provider
of the OSS.9 This implies that the lower wage oﬀer, wL, of the separating
equilibrium can be approximated by the zero-proﬁt wage oﬀer, wP, of a pool-
ing equilibrium. Because programming for pay has neither play value, nor –
since the source code is closed – gift beneﬁt, the zero-proﬁt wage oﬀer for all
individuals prior to OSS provision must be wL = wP = π(¯ c).
We can state the following payoﬀs: if the OSS is developed by individual
j 6= i at time t ≤ Ti, i’s payoﬀ – independent of whether we are in a pooling
8As discussed in the introduction, in what follows we do not establish the actual equilib-
ria of this game. Rather, we exploit some characteristics of two broad classes of equilibria,
namely separating and pooling equilibria of the signaling game, based on simple necessary
conditions alone.
9Put diﬀerently, we assume that removing one certain agent from the pool of program-
mers via the signal does not change the ex-ante productivity of all ﬁrms. Yet adding this
one agent to a speciﬁc ﬁrm may alter the ex-post proﬁts of that ﬁrm such that the wage
wH is justiﬁed. The more precise speciﬁcation would of course read wL < wP, but only
expand the notation without changing the qualitative results of what follows.















If individual i develops the software at time t, his payoﬀ is
D
P







− (ci − pi)e
−rit (3)
in a pooling equilibrium, and
D
S
i (t) = D
P
i (t) +







in a separating equilibrium. Finally, if no one ever develops the software,






For any separating equilibrium, we have to examine not only the zero-
proﬁt condition of ﬁrms, but also the self-selection constraints of agents. In
particular, the self-selection constraint of the OSS provider demands DS
i (t) >
Fi(t + τ), where τ is the expected delay until some other agent provides.
Noticing that Fi(t) is monotonously falling in t, a stronger condition for an
agent to fulﬁll the self-selection constraint (or self-selection if τ = 0) becomes
DS
i (t) > Fi(t), which after inserting from (2), (3) and (4) becomes:






− (ci − pi)e
−rit > 0 . (5)
In other words, inequality (5) states that to ensure self-selection of the OSS
provider – if a separating equilibrium exists – requires that the high-wage
contract must more than compensate for the net cost of being the provider.
Any individual for whom (5) is fulﬁlled, since DS
i (t) is monotonous and falling
in t, maximizes utility at DS
i (0). Namely, any such individual i will develop
voluntarily and immediately at time t = 0. As stated above, we assume
throughout the paper that the individual costs and beneﬁts are common
knowledge within the community of programmers but unobservable to em-
ployers – hence the value of a signal. Accordingly, under these – arguably
strong – assumptions, the eventual provider is known within the group of
potential providers, and agents know that provision will take place at time
t = 0.10 However, multiple agents may be willing to provide. From the above
10Thus τ = 0 and furthermore, this assumption allows us to set aside the eﬀect that the
timing of provision – and thus the signal and identiﬁcation of the providing agent – has
on ﬁrm proﬁts and hence wH.
10we are unable, without imposing further structure onto the model, to identify
the actual provider of the OSS in such separating equilibria – or in fact if such
equilibria exist at all. Yet, we are able to discern some key characteristics
about agents that are part of this group of potential providers.
In particular, given the presence of the gift and the play value, the actual
provider (receiving wH) may not be the individual with the highest pro-
gramming ability (lowest ci). Thus, there is uncertainty if agents with low
programming ability may display the signal in equilibrium. Depending on
the functional form of π and the distributions Sk one, many or no agent may
fulﬁll (5). Obviously, in the ‘no agent’ case, separation does not occur, leav-
ing pooling situations as candidate equilibria. Yet, if separating equilibria
exist, we can determine the characteristics that will make an individual more
likely to be in the group of potential OSS providers. Formally,
Proposition 1. (Separating Equilibria) If there exist separating equilib-
ria, ceteris paribus a higher separating wage wH attracts more potential OSS
providers; an individual with a
i) lower cost of software development, ci
ii) larger gift beneﬁt, gi
iii) longer time horizon, Ti (younger)
iv) lower discount rate, ri (more patient)
or
v) higher value of play, pi
is more likely to be in the group of potential OSS providers.
Proposition 1 follows from the derivatives of (5).11
Next we turn to OSS provision in pooling equilibria. Even though all
agents receive the same wage in such situations, we are still able to deduce
some important characteristics of the likely OSS provider. From (2), (3) and
(1) it follows that Fi(t) > DP
i (t) for all t, and hence this situation constitutes
an n player complete information war of attrition.12 By allowing individuals
to postpone their decision for some time, for example to wait and see if
someone else is developing the OSS software, important dynamics emerge.
Obviously the length of time a member of the community n is willing to wait
depends on his beneﬁt from the existence of the OSS, the cost of developing
the software himself, and his time preference. Following Hendricks et al.
(1988) and Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996), one can characterize the following
11The derivatives are provided in Appendix A at the end of the manuscript.
12See e.g. Hendricks et al. (1988) or Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996). The one-shot
intra-community game of OSS provision features a host of pure and mixed-strategy Nash
equilibria in which anyone might be the developer of the software. The war of attrition
emerges once individuals are allowed to out-wait each other.
11equilibria for this type of game: for every individual i there is a subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome in which only i will develop immediately. Or
more intuitively, if no one other than i develops, then i’s best strategy is
to develop immediately, and if i develops immediately, everyone else’s best
strategy is to wait.
Thus, the game permits – as is usual for this type of game – many subgame
perfect equilibria in which anyone might volunteer. However, the set of
subgame perfect equilibria here is radically reduced because time horizons
are ﬁnite (see Bilodeau and Slivinski, 1996). Based on this assumption, we
are able to characterize the individual that will actually provide the public
good in a pooling equilibrium when a war of attrition takes place. The eﬀect
of a ﬁnite time horizon is that the game becomes non-stationary. Thus, from
an agent’s perspective, there is a point in time ¯ t where he will no longer
choose to develop the OSS.13 Beyond that point in time, even when the
software is not provided, a dominant strategy is to not develop at all, i.e.
DP
i (t) < Ri ∀ t > ¯ ti. Solving for DP
i (¯ t) = Ri deﬁnes this point in time. In
particular, individual i will not develop the OSS after time






zi + gi + ri(pi − ci)

. (6)
Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996, p. 304) show that for this situation, there ex-
ists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the individual with the
highest ¯ ti volunteers at time t = 0. The intuition for this result is straight-
forward. If you know that you are the one with the highest beneﬁt/cost
ratio of developing the OSS, and if you know that everyone else knows this
as well, then you might as well give in right away. Thus, even though we
allow individuals to wait, the war of attrition with full information features
no rational delay. Software is developed sooner rather than later. The in-
dividual actually developing the software is characterized by the highest ¯ t.14
This enables us to characterize the likely OSS programmer. Formally,
Proposition 2. (Pooling Equilibria - War of Attrition) If there exist
pooling equilibria where individuals play a war of attrition, ceteris paribus an
individual with a
i) higher gain from the software, zi
ii) larger gift beneﬁt, gi
13Another interpretation of ¯ ti is: “Suppose it is time t. What is my beneﬁt if I contribute
now, versus not contributing at all?”
14Notice that existence of a pooling equilibrium requires the information that an agent
has the highest ¯ ti to provide no statistical information for ﬁrms on ci. There might be
conditions where this is not the case, implying the possibility of separation.
12iii) longer time horizon, Ti (younger)
iv) lower discount rate, ri (more patient)
v) lower cost of software development, ci
or
vi) higher value of play, pi
is more likely to provide the OSS.
Proposition 2 follows from the derivatives of ¯ ti.15
4 Discussion of the model results
Comparing the provider characterizations given in Proposition 1 and Propo-
sition 2 to empirical accounts and our discussion in Section 2, we ﬁnd that
several of the model predictions match well with the stylized facts on OSS
programmer characteristics. Empirical work ﬁnds that the ‘average’ OSS
contributor is young, well-educated, enjoys programming, and values gift-
culture type rewards. Hars and Ou (2002), for example, ﬁnd 54 percent of
the contributors in their sample to be less than 29 years of age and 72 per-
cent to have a bachelor’s, master’s or Ph.D. degree. Similar results are found
by Hertel et al. (2003), Lakhani and Wolf (2005), Krishnamurthy (2002).
Furthermore, Luthiger (2005) and Lakhani and Wolf (2006) conclude from
their empirical studies that the fun of programming is a major motivational
driver. The role of community identiﬁcation and other gift culture related
values are pointed out in the surveys of Hertel et al. (2003) and Lakhani and
Wolf (2006).
Thus, by introducing the possibility of such unconventional motives into
a private-provision-of-public-goods framework with signaling, we found that
– fully in line with the evidence available – provision of OSS will be swift, and
that programmers will be young and eﬃcient (talented/well-educated/low-
cost), will have a high play value associated with programming (homo ludens
payoﬀ), and will value the gift culture surrounding OSS.
Furthermore, a comparison of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 shows that
the derived characteristics of OSS programmers are largely identical. This is
notable, given that very diﬀerent solution techniques are invoked. It implies
that, driven by the public good characteristic of OSS, the pure observation
that signals are possible and that individuals value signals need not imply
that the situation results in a separating equilibrium. Put diﬀerently, the
formal model establishes the non-obvious result that the signaling motive
15The derivatives of ¯ ti are provided in appendix B at the end of the manuscript.
13cannot be distinguished from intrinsic motives by simply mapping out in-
dividual valuations for either of them.16 Furthermore, what is surprising in
the formal results is that user-programmer gains, zi, turn out to impact dif-
ferently in a pooling compared to a separating situation. The agent’s own
beneﬁt from the public good he is producing, zi, drives providers to develop
the OSS in a pooling situation, but it does not contribute as a force putting an
agent into the group of potential providers in separating situations. We think
that this ﬁnding is of some interest because much of the literature emphasizes
user-programmer beneﬁts as central to the OSS issue. Our framework hints
that there might in fact be a clash when evoking signaling arguments simul-
taneously with user-programmer arguments. Yet, this conclusion should not
be pushed too far since our results for the separating case do not establish
the actual provider and are only based on the self-selection constraint. It is
quite clear that after reﬁning the equilibrium and adding suﬃcient structure
onto the problem, there will most likely be an impact of zi on selecting the
actual provider in the separating case. Finally, our framework displays the
feature that wage increases for the agent displaying the signal only play a
role in separating equilibria, while the size of wages of course has no eﬀect
in situations of pooling equilibria.
The above results hint at a number of empirical avenues for future re-
search. The clearest empirically testable hypothesis implied by the model
apparatus concerns of course the question whether or not there are observ-
able wage diﬀerentials between computer programmers that do or do not
have a prior history of OSS programming. If one found that no signiﬁcant
wage diﬀerentials exist, this would indicate a pooling equilibrium; but if a
wage premium turns out to be associated with OSS programming, this would
be consistent with the signaling hypothesis. To the best of our knowledge,
no empirical studies exist addressing the issue of wage premia for OSS pro-
grammers. Furthermore, the above framework implies certain dynamics of
programmer motives. For example, if one accepts the notion that early,
immature project phases command lower signaling values than mature and
successful OSS projects, then the role of direct user-programmer beneﬁts
should become less relevant over the life cycle of projects. Finally, and most
importantly, future empirical research should address the issue of motive in-
teraction and overlap that is implied by the presence of multiple motives as
drivers for OSS contributors.
16Furthermore, as noted above, the gift and play value might overcompensate cost dis-
advantages in providing the OSS. This has far reaching eﬀects on the identiﬁcation of
the most eﬃcient individual by the ﬁrms looking for employees. Put diﬀerently, intrinsic
motives can distort signals, such that the separating outcome may not be viable.
145 Conclusion
This paper attempts to shed light on the puzzling fact that even though
OSS is a privately provided public good and should accordingly suﬀer from
under-provision or low quality, it evolves quite to the contrary at a rapid
pace, is developed for free by highly qualiﬁed, young, motivated individuals,
and in fact poses a viable alternative to commercial software products. Based
on a review of the OSS phenomenon and the motives behind it, we adapt a
private-provision-of-public-goods model in the tradition of Bliss and Nalebuﬀ
(1984), Hendricks et al. (1988) and Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996) to address
this puzzle and to characterize those agents who ﬁnd it worthwhile to develop
OSS.
Existing economic accounts of the OSS phenomena emphasize various
extrinsic and intrinsic motives. The main contribution of our paper is that
extrinsic motives such as signaling and intrinsic motives such as need for a
particular software solution, the fun of play, and gift culture are incorpo-
rated simultaneously. In particular the latter two motives, although widely
acknowledged in the social sciences in general, are often ignored in economics,
yet carry important insights for the case at hand.
Our paper incorporates these motives into a private-provision-of-public-
goods model. Given the extrinsic motive of signaling, we examine some key
characteristics of classes of separating and pooling equilibria, where agents
in the latter case play out a war of attrition. We ﬁnd that both types of
equilibria feature similar characteristics for the likely OSS provider. Ceteris
paribus the provider extracts a higher gain from using the software (pooling
equilibria) or is attracted by a higher separating wage (separating equilibria);
furthermore the provider obtains a larger gift beneﬁt, has a longer time
horizon (i.e. is a younger individual), has higher programming skills (lower
costs of development), and is deriving a high value from play (homo ludens
payoﬀ). These results compare well with empirical accounts of the OSS
phenomenon.
Our model also raises several new questions. First, to answer the question
if job-signaling plays a signiﬁcant role in motivating OSS programmers it has
to be tested empirically if a wage premium for programmers contributing to
OSS projects exists. Second, for modelling dynamics in the motive-mix of
OSS programmers, empirical work has to analyse the movements between the
single motives during the life cycle of an OSS project as well as during the
“programming career” of an OSS developer. Finally, the motives discussed
are likely to interact in complex ways, an issue that so far has not been
examined formally since solid empirical evidence on these issues is lacking.
15A Appendix: Proposition 1
From (5) deﬁne
φ =
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∂pi = −e−rit < 0. Finally, evaluating the derivative of (A.1) wrt
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Since π(¯ c) < wH in a separating equilibrium, we have that A.2 is negative if
(eri Ti − 1 − ri Ti) > 0. Rearranging and taking logs gives ri Ti > log(ri Ti)
which is true ∀ riTi > 0, and hence we have
∂φ
∂ri < 0.
B Appendix: Proposition 2 – derivatives of ¯ ti
In the limit when Ti approaches inﬁnity, inequality (1) can be stated as:
zi + gi + ri(pi − ci) > 0 ∀ i ∈ [1,n] (B.1)
And the war of attrition (pooling equilibrium) condition, becomes:
ci − pi >
gi
ri
∀ i ∈ [1,n] (B.2)
Own value of OSS and gift beneﬁt: The derivatives of (6) with
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16Programming cost and homo ludens payoﬀ: The derivatives of (6)
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By (B.1) the denominator in (B.5) is positive. Hence,
∂¯ ti
∂ci < 0 and
∂¯ ti
∂pi > 0.













Which is the sum of a negative and a positive term. We want to show that
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zi+gi+ri(pi−ci). By (B.1) and (B.2 ) we have a > 1. Inequality
(B.8) can now be stated as:
a − log(a) > 1 (B.9)
which is true for all a ∈ R+|a 6= 1. Hence,
∂¯ ti
∂ri < 0.
C Appendix: Why is OSS a public good?
A crucial prerequisite for our examination of the OSS phenomenon is the
assumption that such software is indeed a public good. A closer look at
the requirements for its classiﬁcation as a public good shows that the li-
cense terms diﬀerentiate between open source and commercial proprietary
software. Due to the fact that software is an immaterial good, the use of
the program code by one individual does not aﬀect its use by another indi-
vidual. Therefore software is non-rival in its consumption (Houghton, 1992,
p.5; Quintas, 1994). Thus, the ﬁrst characteristic of a public good is fulﬁlled
by all software programs (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). As to the second
17characteristic – non-excludability – it is important to note that development
of OSS goes back to the late seventies, when the free exchange of software
source codes was common (Stallman, 1999). Only since the emergence of
proprietary software at the beginning of the eighties have commercial enter-
prises started to exclude users from the use of their software via copyright
licenses and by distribution of compiled software, etc. Since then, the pub-
lic good character of some software programs has become a distinguishing
feature. It is obvious that those programmers who wanted their software to
remain open to anyone interested and who wanted to prevent a commercial
‘hijacking’ of the software had to make sure that their software remained
non-excludable. As a reaction to this challenge, the Free Software Founda-
tion (FSF) was founded to guarantee the free access to the software of this
group by developing corresponding licenses. Diﬀerent licenses, e.g. GNU
GPL, GNU LGPL17, were introduced which ensure that the source code of
software can be copied, modiﬁed, distributed freely and – most importantly
– that all further developments fall under the same open source license (FSF
(2004)). Taking the non-rivalry of software together with the FSF software
licenses, which guarantee non-excludability, OSS qualiﬁes as a public good.
17GNU is a recursive acronym for ‘GNU’s not Unix’, further, GNU General Public
License (GNU GPL), GNU Lesser General Public License (GNU LGPL).
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